General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
General Provisions
Chapter 3


As discussed in [1], pseudonymisation has an important role in GDPR as a security measure (art. 32 GDPR), as well as in the context of data protection by design (art. 25 GDPR). The most obvious benefit of pseudonymisation is to hide the identity of the data subjects from any third party (i.e. other than the pseudonymisation entity) in the context of a specific data processing operation. Still, pseudonymisation can go beyond hiding real identities into supporting the data protection goal of unlinkability [2], i.e. reducing the risk that privacy-relevant data can be linked across different data processing domains. Furthermore, pseudonymisation (being itself a data minimisation technique) can contribute towards the principle of data minimisation under GDPR, for example in cases where the controller does not need to have access to the real identities of data subjects but only to their pseudonyms. Last, another important benefit of pseudonymisation that should not be underestimated is that of data accuracy (for a more detailed analysis of the role of pseudonymisation, see in [1]).

Taking the aforementioned benefits into consideration, this Chapter presents different pseudonymisation scenarios that can be found in practice, listing the various actors and the specific goals of pseudonymisation in each case.


A common data pseudonymisation scenario is when data are collected directly from the data subjects and pseudonymised by the data controller, for subsequent internal processing.

Figure 1: Pseudonymisation example Scenario 1

In Figure 1, the data controller (Alpha Corp.) has the role of the pseudonymisation entity, as it performs the selection and assignment of pseudonyms to identifiers. It must be pointed out that the data subjects do not necessarily know nor learn their particular pseudonym, as the pseudonymisation secret (e.g. the pseudonymisation mapping table in this example), is known only to Alpha Corp. The role of pseudonymisation in this case is to enhance the security of personal data either for internal use (e.g. sharing between different units of the controller)11 or in the case of a security incident.


This scenario is a variation of scenario 1, where a data processor is also involved in the process by obtaining the identifiers from the data subjects (on behalf of the controller). However, the pseudonymisation is still performed by the controller.

Figure 2: Pseudonymisation example Scenario 2

In Figure 2, a dedicated data processor (Beta Inc.) is given the task to collect the identifiers from the data subjects and forward this information to a subsequent data controller (Alpha Corp.), which finally performs the pseudonymisation. The controller is again the pseudonymisation entity. An example for such a scenario might be a cloud service provider that hosts data collection services on behalf of the data controller. Then, the controller still is in charge of applying data pseudonymisation prior to any subsequent processing. The goals for pseudonymisation are the same as in scenario 1 (but this time a processor is also involved in the process).


Contrary to the previous case, in this scenario the data controller again performs the pseudonymisation but this time the processor is not involved in the process but only receives the pseudonymised data from the controller.

Figure 3 shows a data controller (Alpha Corp.) collecting data and performing the task of data pseudonymisation (in its role as pseudonymisation entity). The difference with previous scenarios is that now this data controller forwards the pseudonymised data to a subsequent data processor (Beta Inc.), e.g. for statistical analysis, or persistent data storage. In this scenario, the protection goal provided by data pseudonymisation can unfold: Beta Inc. does not learn the identifiers of the data subjects, thus is not directly able to re-identify the natural persons behind the data (assuming that no other attribute that could lead to re-identification is available to Beta Inc.). In this way, pseudonymisation protects the security of the data with regard to the processor.

Figure 3: Pseudonymisation example Scenario 3

A variation of this scenario could be the case where the pseudonymised data is not sent to a data processor but to another data controller (e.g. in the context of a legal obligation of the original controller or another legal basis).


Another possible scenario is the case where the task of pseudonymisation is assigned by the controller to a data processor (e.g. a cloud service provider that manages the pseudonymisation secret and/or arranges the relevant technical facilities).

Figure 4: Pseudonymisation example Scenario 4

Figure 4 shows a case where the personal data are sent by the data subjects to a data processor (Beta Inc), which subsequently performs the pseudonymisation, thus acting as the pseudonymisation entity on behalf of the controller (Alpha Corp). The pseudonymised data is then forwarded to the data controller. In this particular scenario, only the pseudonymised data are stored on the controller’s side. In this way, security at controller’s level is enhanced through data de-identification (e.g. in case of data breach at controller’s side).Still, in all cases the controller is able to re-identify the data subjects through the data processor. Moreover, security at processor’s side becomes of great importance.

A variation of this scenario could be a case where several different processors are involved in the pseudonymisation process as a sequence of pseudonymisation entities (chain of processors). 


In this scenario the pseudonymisation is performed by a third party (not a processor) who subsequently forwards the data to the controller. Contrary to the Scenario 4, the controller in this scenario does not have access to the data subjects’ identifiers (as the third party is not under the control of the data controller).

Figure 5 shows a case where the personal data are sent to a third party (Gamma SE), which subsequently performs the pseudonymisation, thus acting as the pseudonymisation entity. The pseudonymised data is then forwarded to the data controller (Alpha Corp). In this scenario, the data controller cannot directly or indirectly link individual data records to data subjects itself. In this way, security and data protection at controller’s level are enhanced in accordance with the principle of data minimisation. Such scenario can be applicable in cases where the controller does not need to have access to the identities of the data subjects (but only to the pseudonyms).

Figure 5: Pseudonymisation example Scenario 5

This scenario could be very relevant to cases of joint controllership, where one of the controllers is performing the pseudonymisation (acting as the trusted third party - TTP in figure 5), and the other one only receives the pseudonymised data for further processing.

An interesting variation of this scenario (that would require further analysis) could be the case where the TTP is distributed over more than one entities, which can only jointly create and revert pseudonyms (or possibly based on a secret sharing scheme), so that one does not have to put trust only into a single entity.


This is a special case of pseudonymisation where the pseudonyms are created by the data subjects themselves as part of the overall pseudonymisation process.

As can be seen in the example of Figure 6, every individual generates his/her pseudonym, then forwards their data with this pseudonym onwards12.

Figure 6: Pseudonymisation example Scenario 6

An example of such type of data pseudonymisation systems would be the use of the public key of a key pair in blockchain systems (e.g. Bitcoin) to produce the pseudonym. The goal of pseudonymisation in such case is that the controller does not learn13 the identifiers of the data subjects and the data subjects can be in control of the pseudonymisation process; of course, the responsibility of the overall pseudonymisation scheme still rests with the data controller14. Again this is in line with the principle of data minimisation and can be applied in cases where the controller does not need to have access to the original identifiers (i.e. the pseudonyms are sufficient for the specific data processing operation).